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Abstract 
 
This study shows that in a two-player infinitely repeated game where one is 
patient and the other is impatient, Pareto-superior subgame perfect 
equilibrium can be achieved. An impatient player in this paper is depicted as 
someone who can truly destroy the possibility of attaining any feasible and 
individually rational outcome that is supported in equilibrium in repeated 
games, as asserted by the Folk Theorem. In this scenario, the main 
ingredient for the restoration of equilibrium is to introduce the notion of 
tolerant trigger strategy. Consequently, the use of the typical trigger strategy 
is abandoned since it ceases to be efficient as it only brings automatically 
the game to its punishment path, therefore eliminating the possibility of 
extracting other feasible equilibria. I provide a simple characterization of 
perfect equilibrium payoffs under this scenario and show that cooperative 
outcome can be approximated. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Apart from the inherent need of a credible threat of punishment, a central requirement for 
obtaining a cooperative outcome in repeated games is that players must be sufficiently patient. For 
if such condition is lacking, future payoffs will be valued less which makes it conducive to anyone 
to simply deviate from any long-term contract at the early stage. Even those who supposed to 
reprove a deviant may also find it less attractive to fulfill their duty of punishing if the payoff for 
doing so decreases rapidly over time. Thus, it makes sense why a certain level of patience is 
needed in the Folk Theorem with discounting – which asserts that all feasible and individually 
rational outcomes (i.e. outcomes that are Pareto-superior to the minimax payoff of the initial 
single-stage game) can be supported in equilibrium in an infinitely-repeated game1. 
 
When a certain player in a game is impatient, it is easy to see that any cooperative effort is hardly 
sustainable through time for that player wishes only to extract the highest gain the soonest 
possible. Such player does not even have to worry about future punishments since the future is less 
meaningful to him. And so, despite the good intentions others may have in leading the game to 
better results, their knowledge of the presence of the impatient player compels them not to attempt 
for any risky cooperative action from the very start. Thus, the game simply reverts to the unwanted 
equilibrium of the original single-stage game. However, some prospects of obtaining a better 
equilibrium may re-emerge, particularly when a different strategy is adopted during this kind of 
situation. 
 
Imagine a two-player infinitely-repeated game where players have different time preferences or, 
say simply, different temperaments: one is patient (with high discount factor) and the other is 
impatient (with low discount factor). Suppose further that the impatient one is so impatient that 
even the harshest punishment of penalizing him forever, in case he deviates from the typical 
trigger strategy2, would not matter to him since he only cares for the current period. He therefore 
cannot be trusted to cooperate since cheating in the first period is always more rewarding to him. 
On the other end, as the patient player is aware of this, she may simply apply at the outset a 
strategy that will minimize her opponent’s maximum payoff (i.e. minimax strategy) thus, 
eliminating any possibility of achieving a cooperative outcome. 
 
One can argue, however, that the end of this game depends so much on how the patient player will 
play the game. Being a patient person, she has the capacity to tolerate the other player initially, 
even at the expense of getting a very low payoff, provided that this gesture makes the other player 
cooperate in the succeeding stages. In this paper, I show that this set-up is possible for as long as 
both players are made better-off than in a situation when no such tolerance is initiated. More 
importantly, it can be shown that this strategy is subgame perfect in the sense that both players are 
deterred from deviating at any time since punishment is self-enforcing at every subgame.    
    
                                                 
1 Aumann & Shapley (1976) and Rubinstein (1979) showed that the equilibrium in the Folk Theorem without 
discounting is subgame perfect. Abreu (1988) and Fudenberg & Maskin (1986) showed later on that this also holds 
when minimal discounting on future payoffs is applied. 
2 The typical trigger strategy referred here is when both players continue to play the cooperative outcome for as long as 
no one has deviated in the past. In case either player deviates, both respond by defecting forever. 
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Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) examined this case of non-homogenous discount factors between two 
players, although they maintained that both remain very patient on the absolute scale. They 
showed that the difference in the discount factors could allow some trade between payoffs of 
players across time which broadens the set of feasible outcomes. This result is supported in this 
paper as certain individually rational equilibria can also be generated outside the typical convex 
hull of the stage-game payoffs using the above set-up. The main difference is that here, we explore 
the case where there exists an absolute impatient player who can single-handedly destroy the 
possibility of supporting a cooperative outcome in equilibrium. It is therefore shown how certain 
tolerant strategies can restore equilibrium and even approximate a cooperative outcome by using 
the disparity in the time preferences of the two players.  
 
Generally, the structure of a tolerant strategy along its (initial) contract path is a deterministic 
sequence of pure-strategy actions. In particular, we study those types that exhibit periodic structure 
over time under a perfect monitoring environment. For example, a patient player may agree to 
tolerate the other for two stages provided that a cooperative play is performed in the next three 
stages, and then tolerate again for the next two stages, and so on. This cyclical set-up works 
continuously ad infinitum for as long as no deviation has occurred in the past. A deviation at any 
time from either player leads the game to its punishment phase that imposes minimax strategies. 
We assume in this paper that such strategies are observable if these can only be implemented 
through mixed-strategy actions.   
 
When a cooperative outcome is not attained, it is true that some correlated strategies between the 
two players could still approximate it despite having a reduced set of equilibrium payoffs caused 
by the impatient player. However, employing tolerant strategies do no less. It can further be shown 
that even in an extreme case of “impatience”, when public randomization can no longer generate 
individually rational equilibrium payoffs under the normal trigger strategy, these tolerant trigger 
strategies can still continue to generate some of these equilibria.  
 
The next section illustrates the main idea of this paper through a concrete example. Section 3 
establishes the environment governing around the problem while sections 4-7 provide a formal 
analysis. Section 8 concludes by discussing some difficulties in generalizing some results. 
 
 
 
2. Example 
 
Consider a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with the following payoffs:  
      
     C                D 
  3,3   0,4 
  4,0   1,1 
 
The minimax point of this game is (1,1) and for 31<δ , an infinitely repeated game cannot obtain 
any equilibrium other than the players’ minimax point, which in this case is also the Nash 
equilibrium. Hence, each player will only settle to receive an average payoff of 1 in the repeated 
game. 
 
C 
D 
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Assume now that the two players have different valuation on time: 311 <δ  and 312 ≥δ . Then, 
suppose that Player 2 offers a strategy wherein she will always play C provided that Player 1 
alternates his actions between D and C, starting with D. Any deviation from this strategy from 
either player prompts both of them to play D forever after. In other words, Player 2 tolerates Player 
1 in stage one (and in all succeeding odd-number stages) and endures receiving 0, which is even 
lower than her minimax payoff.  
 
The rationale behind Player 2’s offer is that if this strategy succeeds, she will receive an average 
income3 of )1/(3 22 δδ +  32 2( . . 0 3 0 3 ...)i e δ δ+ + + +  which is greater than her average income when 
no such offer is made, provided that 212 >δ . On the part of Player 1, he will accept the offer since 
this strategy promises him an average payoff of  )1/()34( 11 δδ ++ 2 31 1 1( . . 4 3 4 3 ...)i e δ δ δ+ + + + , 
which is always a lot more than what he will get when he is not tolerated. 
 
This strategy is a subgame perfect equilibrium and is shown in the following manner:  
 
In this strategy, Player 1 will not think of deviating from playing D in the 1st stage knowing that he 
will be tolerated by Player 2. If he were to think of deviating, it must be in the 2nd stage where he is 
bound to get a lower payoff by reciprocating Player 2’s goodwill. Deviating in the 2nd stage 
therefore becomes irresistible when his average income from the path 2 31 1 1(4, 4 , , , ...)δ δ δ exceeds 
that of simply sticking to the strategy, i.e. 2 31 1 1(4,3 ,4 ,3 , ...)δ δ δ . This condition is presented as:  
   ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+−−>⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−++− 21
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
11 1
3
1
4)1(
1
44)1( δ
δ
δδδ
δδδ   0133 121 <−+⇒ δδ  
Solving for 1δ , Player 1 will deviate when 26.06
321
1 ≈
−<δ .   
 
For Player 2, deviating in the 1st stage, i.e. playing D, will only bring back the game to its minimax 
point which means that both players ended up playing (D,D) in every stage thereafter. Besides, she 
would not opt to deviate at this stage knowing that her offer will be rewarding in the long run, for 
as long as 212 >δ . The case is different in the 2nd stage where there arises also a temptation for 
her to deviate. This possible deviation is realized when the path 2 32 2 2(0, 4 , , , ...)δ δ δ becomes more 
profitable than 32 2(0, 3 , 0, 3 , ...)δ δ . That is: 
     
2
2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
3(1 ) 4 (1 )
1 1
δ δδ δ δδ δ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− + > − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
  013 2
2
2 <−−⇒ δδ  
Solving for 2δ , Player 2 will deviate when 77.06
113
2 ≈
+<δ . 
 
One can check that the condition for deviating in all subsequent odd-number stages of the repeated 
game is similar to the respective condition each player face during the 1st stage. Similarly, all 
succeeding even-number stages establish the same condition as in the 2nd stage, respective to each 
player (see Lemma 1). Thus, the Nash equilibrium of this infinitely repeated game exists for: 
                                                 
3 Average income is computed in its discounted form over infinite stages as ttt P
1
1)1(
−∞=∑− δδ , where Pt is the payoff 
at stage t. Note also that the formula 2 11 ... (1 ) / (1 )n nδ δ δ δ δ−+ + + + = − −  will be extensively used in this paper. 
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      1
21 3 1
,
36
δ −⎡ ⎞∈ ⎟⎢⎣ ⎠   and  2
13 1
, 1
6
δ +⎡ ⎞∈ ⎟⎢⎣ ⎠ . 
 
When either player deviates at any stage of the game, the strategy calls for each player a 
punishment path of minimaxing each other thereafter i.e. playing (D,D) from then on. And since 
(D,D) is a Nash equilibrium of the prisoner’s dilemma game, neither player can gain by deviating 
from this punishment path which establishes credibility in rendering punishment4. Therefore, the 
set of Nash equilibrium points of this strategy is also a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
 
By inputting all the equilibrium-generating values of 1δ  and  2δ  into the average income of each 
player, we illustrate the set of all possible perfect equilibrium payoffs in Figure 1 by the 
rectangular block. Notice that it is outside the typical feasible and individually rational set of 
payoffs generated in a repeated game with very patient players. 
 
                                        
 
               
 
 
 
3. Framework 
 
Consider an −∞ fold repeated game G ),( PM δδ∞ with two players, M (impatient) and P (patient), 
and their respective discount factors Mδ  and Pδ , where 0 1M Pδ δ< < < . Write PMPM SSaa ×∈),(  
as a vector of outcomes/actions within the pure strategy space and ( , )i M Pa aµ : M PS S× → \  as 
the continuous payoff function of i, where i= PM , . For convenience, we denote an unsubscripted 
bold symbol as a vector of two players (e.g. ( , )M Pa a=a ) and denote ~i to refer to the other 
player.  Fix the minimax payoff for each player as ),(maxminˆ ~
~~
iiiSaSai
aaV
iiii
µ
∈∈
= . For a set of feasible 
                                                 
4 This punishment path is known in the literature as the Cournot-Nash reversion which was employed extensively by 
Friedman (1971). In the example of a prisoner’s dilemma game, the Cournot-Nash punishment inherently coincides 
with the minimax punishment.        
   ( 3, 3 ) 
     (1,1) 
   ( 4, 0 ) 
   ( 0,4 ) 
Player 1 
Player 2
      Figure 1: In the above example, the set of equilibrium payoffs is depicted 
             by  the rectangular block that is outside the typical convex hull.  
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payoffs F, which is also defined as the convex hull of the set { ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ,M P M PV V V V=aµ  for   
some }M PS S∈ ×a , denote a subset R to be the set of individually rational outcomes i.e. { }ˆ( , ) , for bothM P i iR V V V V i= ∈ >F . Let ),( VV  be some vector payoff not in R, such that 
VVVV ii <<< ˆ  and which we shall be using later on for tolerant strategies. And without loss of 
generality, we set  VVi ˆˆ =  and the cooperative outcome as RVV cc ∈),( . Finally, we assume that    
G ),( PM δδ∞  is played under a complete information environment.  
 
The game G ),( PM δδ∞ is played throughout a discrete time denoted by { }1, 2,3,...t∈ . Let its 
outcome path be { } 1( ( ))t tt ∞=a σ , wherein a strategy )(tiσ  at stage t is chosen from iS  based on the 
history of the game at t-1, i.e.  ii S∈)1(σ  and for t>1, itPMi SSSt →× −1)(:)(σ . This characterizes 
the player’s choice of action ( ( ))tia tσ  at stage t as a function of the information gathered from the 
previous t-1 actions. This history is public and is known to both players as each can observe the 
other’s action directly at every stage.  
 
Now, suppose the cooperative payoff cV  cannot be supported by any equilibrium in the repeated 
game, such that M  will always find it profitable to cheat in the first stage even if he has to bear the 
subsequent (minimaxing) punishment forever. That is: 
 
 
   2 2ˆ ˆ... ...c c M c M M MV V V V V Vδ δ δ δ+ + + < + + +   ⇔  MMc VVV δδ ˆ)1( +−<     
      ⇔  ˆcM
V V
V V
δ δ −< = −
  
 
 
Knowing that M cannot be trusted to cooperate since Mδ δ<  , P on her part will simply minimax M  
right from the start, inducing him to get only Vˆ  throughout the repeated game. And if P does not 
minimax M, she herself will be minimaxed by M by virtue of M’s impatience, and so on. Notice 
that this “mutual” minimaxing punishment scheme is enough to make the game always settle at 
)ˆ,ˆ( VV 5.  The impact of the presence of impatient player on pure-strategy equilibria is drastic since 
once Mδ  moves a little lower than δ , the Pareto optimal outcome ( , )c cV V  is immediately replaced 
by an inferior equilibrium )ˆ,ˆ( VV . Some individually rational payoffs for M may still be sustained 
in equilibrium despite his low discount factor (i.e. those average payoffs higher than cV ) if actions 
                                                 
5 In some cases, a binding minimaxing punishment scheme )ˆˆ ,( VV demands that a continuously increasing penalty at 
every succeeding stage is established in order that punishment is surely inflicted to avoid being punished more 
severely in the next stage. This complication on higher-order punishments was resolved by Abreu (1988) by 
introducing a simple punishment strategy that does not depend on the previous sequence of deviations and which can 
be supported in perfect equilibrium. Furthermore, such minimaxing actions may require mixed strategies in general 
and one has to assume that they are observable to obtain the Folk Theorem result. However this assumption is not 
indispensable as argued by Fudenberg and Maskin (1991) since the same result can also be achieved by employing 
over time a cyclical set of alternating pure actions with the appropriate frequency. 
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are made contingent on the result of some public randomization. However, most of them still fail 
particularly those between Vˆ and cV , since none these payoffs can do so much in deterring M from 
deviating in the first period. 
 
 
4. Tolerant Strategy  
 
The problem that some individually rational payoffs cannot anymore be sustained in equilibrium 
due to the presence of an impatient player is expected from the Folk Theorem that admits only the 
existence of sufficiently patient agents. This loss of equilibrium points is explained by the fact that 
both players continue to hold on to a trigger strategy that aims for the optimal cooperative outcome 
when it is no longer attainable. Consequently, the strategy ceases to be efficient since it 
automatically leads the game towards its punishment path that immediately penalizes both players 
and only eliminates the possibility of extracting some other feasible gains.  
 
This scenario, however, is changed when the patient player P (with Pδ δ>  6) abandons the original 
strategy and concedes to adopt a tolerant trigger strategy. Although this may provide unequal and 
suboptimal yields (for P) in general, the generation of Pareto-superior equilibria is shown to be a 
worthwhile consolation as this can even approximate the cooperative outcome. Formally, a tolerant 
trigger strategy is defined as follows:  
 
Definition 1. A tolerant trigger strategy (TTS) is an action profile { } 1( ( ))t tt ∞=a σ  in a repeated 
game G ),( PM δδ∞  which satisfies the following conditions:  
 (i)  there exists a  certain  correlated strategy PMPM SStt ×∈))(),(( σσ  that  generates 
   stage  payoffs ( )tM cVµ ′ >a  and ˆ( )tP Vµ ′ <a  at some stages { }1, 2,3,t′∈ … , where 
 : ( ( ), ( ))t t PM t tσ σ′ ′ ′ ′=a a .   
 (ii) 1
1
ˆ(1 ) ( )t tP P Pt Vδ δ µ∞ −=− >∑ a .    
 (iii) once a deviation occurs at any time d, a minimaxing punishment ˆ ˆ( , )V V  is played 
   from time 1d +  onwards. 
    
The first condition requires the existence of some stage-payoffs that are lower than the individually 
rational level (which allows the other player to earn higher than the cooperative yields) while the 
second guarantees that the average discounted payoff of the tolerant player over the entire repeated 
game is above the individually rational level. The third is the typical trigger punishment path.  
 
I characterize every TTS profile 1{ ( ( ))}
t
i ta t
∞
=σ  as a combination of contract regime which is the 
phase when both players continue to play the game according to what they have initially agreed on 
and a punishment regime that immediately sets in after a breach from the contract regime or from 
the same punishment regime (as will be discussed in section 7) has occurred. At this stage, it 
would be convenient to focus our analysis on infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game 
G ),( PMPD δδ∞  whose punishment regime is stable, being always a Nash equilibrium. This saves us 
from worries about the credibility of punishment and allows us to put more attention on the 
                                                 
6 We simply apply here a strict rather than weak inequality for the purpose of simplifying our results.    
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inherent difficulty that the contract regime of a TTS brings. One can see that unlike in the normal 
trigger strategy, the contract or the initial path of TTS no longer constitutes of playing the same 
action throughout its phase and can even take many different forms. Consequently, the 
continuation strategies at every subgame can differ since payoffs within the contract regime are not 
anymore the same. A simple classification of TTS profiles is presented below where we define 
payoffs during tolerant stages as ( )tM Vµ ′ =a and ( )tP Vµ ′ =a , where again ˆ cV V V V< < < .   
 
Definition 2.   (a) A periodic tolerant trigger strategy ),( ,, 〉〈〉〈 jkP
jk
M σσ  (or PTTS) is a TTS profile 
that has a contract regime of playing alternately k stages of tolerance with stage payoff 
( )t′aµ ),( VV=  and then j stages of cooperation with stage payoff  ),( cc VV  over the game 
G ),( PMPD δδ∞ . We write ),( ,, 〉〈〉〈 kjPkjM σσ to denote a PTTS that starts with cooperative stages.  
  (b) A non-periodic tolerant trigger strategy is a TTS profile that starts with either k 
stages of tolerance followed by infinite stages of cooperation or with j stages of cooperation 
followed by tolerant stages thereafter.  
 
As our analysis is confined only on discrete time between stages, we shall set k and j to be finite 
elements of the set of positive integers, +] .  
 
Proposition 1.  For any Mδ δ<   and 1Pδ <  in  G ),( PMPD δδ∞ , it is impossible to sustain a non-
periodic tolerant trigger strategy in equilibrium. 
 
Proof: 
Suppose it is possible. Then, in any of the following two cases, there exists a scenario when both 
players prefer to stick to the non-periodic TTS than to deviate from it. 
 
Case A: (Tolerance before cooperation) 
Examine M’s behavior. Notice that if M were to deviate, it has to be in the stage of cooperation 
since deviating when he is tolerated will only give him a lower payoff (i.e. VVc< ). Thus, for M to 
remain faithful to the strategy, his payoff must be at least as much as the payoff he gets when he 
deviates at any cooperative stage. 
    ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +− ∑∑ ∞
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−
=
−
1
1
1
1)1(
kt
t
Mc
k
t
t
MM VV δδδ  ⎟⎟⎠
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++=
−+
+
+=
−
=
−
2
1
1
1
1
1 ˆ)1(
qkt
t
M
qk
M
qk
kt
t
Mc
k
t
t
MM VVVV δδδδδ ,   
for all { }0,1, 2,...q∈ and k +∈] , where q is the number of stages of cooperation just before 
defecting.      
 1ˆ)1()1( +++ +−+−≥⇒ qkMMqkMqMkMckMc VVVV δδδδδδ   
 )()ˆ(1 c
qk
M
qk
M VVVV −≥−⇒ +++ δδ  δδ ~ˆ =≥⇒ −
−
VV
VV c
M ,   a contradiction. 
Case B: (Cooperation before tolerance) 
Examine P’s behavior. For P to stick to the (non-periodic) tolerant strategy, the payoff must be at 
least as much as the payoff she gets in any possible stage of deviation. Consider the possible 
deviation at the stage when P is about to start tolerating M (i.e at t=j+1 and that no deviation has 
occurred in the past).  We see that the condition not to deviate at this stage, i.e. 
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1
1
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t
PVδ ∑∞
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−
1
1ˆ
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t
PVδ , j +∀ ∈] and 1Pδ∀ < .      ■ 
 
Remark: 
The proof in case A is general since it considers all of M’s possible deviation in any of the 
cooperative stages, whereas case B picks up only a stage where P’s defection is imminent.  In both 
cases, it is shown that non-periodic TTS breaks down within a given player, independent of the 
other player’s capacity to hold on to the strategy.  
 
In the succeeding subsections, it is presented that perfect equilibrium can be generated under 
PTTS. 
 
(a) Tolerance before cooperation 
 
Definition 3.  In a game G ),( PMPD δδ∞ , any PTTS ),( ,, 〉〈〉〈 jkPjkM σσ  is supported by a subgame perfect 
equilibrium, if for any strategy ii Sd ∈′ )(σ  that differs from strategy 〉〈 jki ,σ at time d onwards, 
,k j +∀ ∈] and },{ PMi∈∀ , we have: 
       1 ,
1
(1 ) ( ( ))t t k ji i itδ δ µ∞ − 〈 〉=− ≥∑ a σ 1 ,~1(1 ) ( ( ( ), ))d t t k ji i i i it dδ δ µ σ σ− 〈 〉= ′− +∑ a     
                         ),()1( ~
1
1 iii
t
idti
ϕϕµδδ −∞ +=∑− , 
 where ),( ~ii ϕϕ  is an action  vector of minimaxing punishment. 
This definition of subgame perfection suffices to hold for prisoner’s dilemma since its minimaxing 
punishment path is always Nash equilibrium. Thus, there is indeed no incentive for players to 
deviate during the punishment regime at any subgame. This leaves us now with the task of 
ensuring only that deviation from the contract path at any stage is never profitable.    
 
However, complexity still arises since continuation payoffs at any time d vary over the infinite 
period and most subgames within the contract regime are no longer identical to the original game. 
Apart from this, the stage payoffs of the two players are non-symmetric which impels us to deal 
with each one’s payoff incentives separately before pinning down the set of perfect equilibrium 
points. 
 
When the PTTS ),( ,, 〉〈〉〈 jkP
jk
M σσ  is followed consistently over the entire game, the respective 
average discounted payoff to M and P are: 
 
 〉〈Π jkM ,  = ∑ ∑∑∞
=Τ
+Τ+
+=
−
=
− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
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and      
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In order for the strategy ),( ,, 〉〈〉〈 jkP
jk
M σσ to be sustained in the game G ),( PMPD δδ∞ , 〉〈Π jki ,  must be at 
least as much as the average discounted payoff of i for the entire game when he/she decides to 
deviate at some time d 7. Although this requires us to identify the condition for the possible 
deviation at each and every stage of the infinite game, the following lemmas (1-3) allow us to 
simplify our investigation. The first limits our investigation from infinite number of stages into just 
the first k+j stages. The second asserts that deviation cannot occur during tolerant stages (k stages) 
while the third shows the monotonic property of payoffs when deviating during the cooperative 
stages (j stages). 
 
Lemma 1. 
The condition not to deviate at the nth stage of a PTTS, where n is an integer from 1 to k+j, is the 
same condition that holds for any n+T(k+j) –th stage, where T is any positive integer.   
 
Proof: 
Let  jkssx
+
=>< 1)(  be an arrangement of payoffs for the first jk+  stages with a discounted sum of 
1
)()2()1(, ...
−+
+>< +++= jkjkjk xxxS δδ . When no deviation occurs from the periodic tolerant 
strategy, ( ) 1
k j
s sx
+
=< >  is repeated infinitely times and has a discounted sum of 
...)(2,,, +++ +><+><>< jkjkjkjkjk SSS δδ  . A deviation at nth stage, where jkn +≤ , has a payoff 
profile of 
1
( ) ( ) ( )1 1
ˆ, ,
n
s n ss s n
x x x
− ∞
= = + , where )(nx  is the payoff from deviating at n and xˆ  is the 
subsequent punishment payoff  the deviant receives. Denoting the discounted sum of this deviation 
path as DS , we write the condition for sticking to the strategy at stage n as 
D
jk
jk
jk
jkjk SSSS ≥+++ +><+><>< ...)(2,,, δδ . 
Now, observe that when deviation occurs at n+(k+j) -th stage, the discounted sum of the deviation 
path is jkDjk SS
+
>< + δ, ; while at n+2(k+j) -th stage, it is jkjkjk SS +><>< + δ,, + )(2 jkDS +δ ; and so on. 
Thus, the condition for not deviating at n+T(k+j) -th  stage, for any positive integer T, is as follows: 
)())(1(
,,,
)(2
,,, ......
jkT
D
jkT
jk
jk
jkjk
jk
jk
jk
jkjk SSSSSSS
++−
><
+
><><
+
><
+
><>< ++++≥+++ δδδδδ . 
 
Cancelling the first T  terms on both sides, we get:       
)())(2(
,
))(1(
,
)(
, ...
jkT
D
jkT
jk
jkT
jk
jkT
jk SSSS
+++
><
++
><
+
>< ≥+++ δδδδ . Then, by dividing  both sides by 
)( jkT +δ , we obtain the same condition Djkjkjkjkjk SSSS ≥+++ +><+><>< ...)(2,,, δδ .           ■ 
 
Lemma 2.  
Both players will not find it profitable under PTTS to deviate during any stage of tolerance. 
  
Proof:  
By definition, player P’s average payoff in sticking to the strategy is higher than the minimax 
level, Vˆ . Clearly, to deviate during any of the prescribed tolerant stages will give her an average 
                                                 
7 This method of comparing the entire-game yield between the no-deviation and the dth period-deviation case should 
provide same result as when comparing only their continuation payoffs from d, since their average discounted payoff 
before d are the same. I refrain from the typical use of continuation payoffs for computational simplicity.  
T  number of terms
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payoff of at most Vˆ , that is, 1 1
1 1
ˆ ˆ(1 )   
k
t t
P P P
t t k
V V Vδ δ δ′ ∞− −
′= = +
⎛ ⎞− + ≤⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ , where k k′≤  is the number of 
tolerant stages conceded before deviating in the next stage. If 0k′ = , then the game reverts to the 
minimax equilibrium where P gets exactlyVˆ . For player M, to deviate at the stage when he is 
tolerated only gives him a lower payoff VVc< . Moreover, the fact that his future stage payoffs are 
reverted to the minimax level after such deviation only deprives him of getting higher average 
income.  ■ 
 
The moment P deviates during one of these tolerant stages, she loses the possibility of getting the 
cooperation of M in the future which could give her greater payoff, enough to even cover her 
losses during those tolerant stages. Similarly, M would not think of deviating during periods of 
tolerance since he is being tolerated to get high returns.  
 
This left us to examine only the possible deviation over the cooperative stages. In particular, we 
seek for the highest payoff one can derive from all these possible deviations during the cooperative 
stages. This is presented formally as follows: 
  
  { } ( ), 1 0,1,... 11 ˆ(1 ) max ( ), , ,
k
k j t
M M M M c Mq jt
D V V q V Vδ δ θ δ−
∈ −=
= − +∑  , where  
   )( ⋅Mθ  = ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++− ∑∑ ∞
++=
−+
+
+=
−
2
1
1
1 ˆ)1(
qkt
t
M
qk
M
qk
kt
t
McM VVV δδδδ   
  { } ( ), 1 0,1,... 11 ˆ(1 ) max ( ), , ,
k
k j t
P P P P c Pr jt
D V V r V Vδ δ θ δ−
∈ −=
= − +∑  , where 
    )( ⋅Pθ  = ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ++− ∑∑ ∞
++=
−++
+=
−
2
1
1
1 ˆ)1(
rkt
t
P
rk
P
rk
kt
t
PcP VVV δδδδ . 
The function ( )iθ ⋅  depicts the average discounted payoff from deviating during the cooperative 
stages while the imbedded parameters q and r are the players’ respective number of stages given to 
cooperation just before deviating from the strategy. Note that when q and r are equal to j, this 
means that deviation occurs at the stage of tolerance which was already ruled out in Lemma 2. 
Lemma 3 allows us to determine the maximum entire-game payoff one can obtain from deviating 
at any time during the cooperative stages.   
    
Lemma 3.  (Monotonicity)  
 (i)  )( ⋅Mθ is monotone decreasing in q. 
 (ii) )( ⋅Pθ  is monotone increasing in r. 
 
Proof:  
(i) )( ⋅Mθ  = ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++− ∑∑ ∞
++=
−+
+
+=
−
2
1
1
1 ˆ)1(
qkt
t
M
qk
M
qk
kt
t
McM VVV δδδδ   
     =  1ˆ)1()1( +++ +−+− qkMMqkMqMkMc VVV δδδδδ  =  1)ˆ()( +++ −−−+ qkMqkMckMc VVVVV δδδ  
     =  ])ˆ()[( Mc
qk
M
k
Mc VVVVV δδδ −−−+ +    =   ˆ( ) ( )k k qc M M MV V Vδ δ δ δ++ − −  
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Both terms in the last right-hand equation are positive. And since 10 << Mδ , qkM+δ decreases in 
q and so as )( ⋅Mθ . 
(ii) )( ⋅Pθ  = ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ++− ∑∑ ∞
++=
−++
+=
−
2
1
1
1 ˆ)1(
rkt
t
P
rk
P
rk
kt
t
PcP VVV δδδδ   
      = 1ˆ)1()1( +++ +−+− rkPPrkPrPkPc VVV δδδδδ   =   ])ˆ()[( PcrkPkPc VVVVV δδδ −−−+ +  
      = ˆ( ) ( )k k rc P P PV V Vδ δ δ δ++ − −  
 Given that δδ ~1 >> P , the last term is always negative and therefore any increase in r reduces 
the negative value of the last term which increases )( ⋅Pθ . ■ 
 
By Lemma 3, we obtain the highest values of )( ⋅Mθ  and )( ⋅Pθ  when q=0 and r=j-1, respectively, 
hence: 
        
       ( ), 1ˆk j kM MD V V V δ += − −    and  ( ) ( ) ( ), 1 ˆk j k k j k jP c P c P PD V V V V V V Vδ δ δ+ − += − − + − − − . 
 
Thus, the no-deviation condition for the strategy ),( ,, 〉〈〉〈 jkP
jk
M σσ , for any ,k j +∈] , is characterized 
by the inequality 〉〈Π jki , ,k jiD≥ , for both i. Consequently, this condition provides a range of values 
of Mδ  and Pδ  that can support the fidelity of players to a periodic tolerant contract parameterized 
by k and j. Caution however should be made that this does not always lead to an equilibrium since 
some outcomes induced by certain periodic contracts may even fail to be individually rational. 
 
(b) Cooperation before tolerance 
 
An impatient player can also be made to cooperate initially despite having Mδ δ<  , provided that 
the contract ensures that he be tolerated afterwards, in a periodic fashion i.e. ),( ,, 〉〈〉〈 kjP
kj
M σσ .  An 
immediate question that can arise is how different is this strategy from the previously discussed 
),( ,, 〉〈〉〈 jkP
jk
M σσ  in characterizing the set of no-deviation outcomes. One can observe immediately 
that their payoff yields are different in the sense that when a PTTS ,,( , )j kj kM Pσ σ〈 〉  is followed 
faithfully over the entire game, the respective average discounted payoff to M and P are: 
 
 〉〈Π kjM ,  = ∑ ∑∑∞
=Τ
+Τ+
+=
−
=
− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−
0
)(
1
1
1
1)1(
kj
M
kj
jt
t
M
j
t
t
McM VV δδδδ  = VVV kj
M
j
Mc +−
−−
+δ
δ
1
)1()(
  
and      
 〉〈Π kjP ,  = ∑ ∑∑∞
=Τ
+Τ
+
+=
−
=
− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−
0
)(
1
1
1
1)1( kjP
kj
jt
t
P
j
t
t
PcP VV δδδδ    = VVV kj
P
j
Pc +−
−−
+δ
δ
1
)1()(
 
 
Notice that these results are different from the earlier presented values of ,k jM
〈 〉Π  and ,k jP〈 〉Π . 
Interestingly however, the conditions that allow the strategy ),( ,, 〉〈〉〈 kjP
kj
M σσ to generate no-deviation 
outcomes are the same with the strategy ),( ,, 〉〈〉〈 jkP
jk
M σσ . In brief, we say that 〉〈Π jki , ,k jiD≥ and 
, ,j k j k
i iD∏ ≥  are identical, as shown in the following proposition. 
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Proposition 2. (Equivalence) For any ,k j +∈] , the PTTS ),( ,, 〉〈〉〈 jkPjkM σσ  and ),( ,, 〉〈〉〈 kjPkjM σσ  
constitute the same range of values of Mδ  and Pδ  that can support  the no-deviation condition 
during the contract regime of the repeated game. These values are defined by the following 
conditions: 
 For player M:     1
j M
M k
M
δ δδ δ δ +
−≥ −

      
 For player P:     ( )11
k
j k P
P P k
P P
A δδ δ δ δ δ
−
−
−≤ + −  , where 0A <   
Proof:   Appendix 
 
From the results of Lemmas 1-3 and Proposition 2, the characterization of the set of perfect 
equilibrium outcomes can now be expressed in the following theorem.   
 
Theorem 1.   In a game G ),( PMPD δδ∞ , where PM δδδ << ~  and where δ~  is the minimum level of 
discount factor that can support a cooperative outcome, there exists a (subgame) perfect 
equilibrium characterized by PTTS ),( ,, 〉〈〉〈 jkP
jk
M σσ and , ,( , )j k j kM Pσ σ〈 〉 〈 〉 , where k and j are finite 
elements of +] , 
(a) for all ( , )MMδ δ δ∈   and )1,( PP δδ ∈ , where ,1M
δδ δδ
⎛ ⎞∈⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
   and ( ,1)Pδ δ∈   and 
(b) with average discounted payoffs of  〉〈Π jkM , , ,j kM〈 〉Π ),( VVc∈  and 〉〈Π jkP , , ,j kP〈 〉Π ),ˆ( cVV∈ . 
Clearly, by the assertion of Theorem 1(b), the classic Folk Theorem result is not obtained here 
since payoffs between Vˆ and cV  are not feasible to M. Nonetheless, the set of perfect equilibrium 
points are well depicted by the range of discount factors that supports them.  
 
Proof:   
 
(a) 
(Step 1) Recall first that any deviation at any stage of a prisoner’s dilemma is responded by a 
minimaxing Nash punishment, making the punishment regime always binding. Thus, one only 
needs to guarantee that there will also be no incentive to deviate during the contract regime. By 
Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, we reduce this condition of no-deviation to ,k ji
〈 〉Π ,k jiD≥ . Proposition 2 
shows us that this condition is similar to that of ,j ki
〈 〉Π ,j kiD≥  and is brought down to the 
following equilibrium constraints for each player:  
 (1.1) For player M:     1
j M
M k
M
δ δδ δ δ +
−≥ −

      
 (1.2) For player P:     ( )11
k
j k P
P P k
P P
A δδ δ δ δ δ
−
−
−≤ + −  ,  where 
 0ˆ
cV VA
V V
−= <−   
We complete the characterization of perfect equilibrium payoffs by invoking the definition of TTS, 
i.e. , ˆk jP VΠ >  and , ˆj kP VΠ >  (individually rational condition (IRC)). We show later in the proof of 
Theorem 1 (b) that these payoffs above Vˆ , along with the requirement (1.2), do certainly exist.  
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Our goal in the next step is to pin down the lowest possible values of Mδ  and Pδ  on which perfect 
equilibrium can still be satisfied. A key to this is the result of Lemma 5, presented at the end of the 
proof.  
 
(Step 2.1)  Let  a correspondence ( )( ): 0,M δ+ +× → ^ ] ] P 8 defined by  
       1( , ) (0, )  ,  for a given ( , )  and (0,1)
j M
M M M k
M
k j k jδ δδ δ δ δδ δ
+ +
+
⎧ ⎫−= ∈ ≥ ∈ × ∈⎨ ⎬−⎩ ⎭
 ^ ] ] . 
Note that inf ( , )M k j^  is defined by some Mδ  that solves the equality part of (1.1) while 
sup ( , )M k j^ = δ . 
(i) Fix  j at oj .Then, as k increases, inf ( , )M ok j^  decreases (by Lemma 5(i)), which expands the 
set ( , )M ok j^ . Thus, M^  is monotone increasing in k, i.e. ( , )M ok j^ ( 1, )M ok j⊂ +^ . 
(ii) Fix k at ok . Then, as j increases, inf ( , )M ok j^  increases (by Lemma 5(i)) and approachesδ . 
Thus, M^  is monotone decreasing in j,  i.e. ( , )M ok j^ ( , 1)M ok j⊃ +^ . 
From (i) and (ii), M^  is biggest when k →∞  and j=1; hence, we solve from (1.1) that the least 
Mδ ,  i.e. Mδ ,  is 1
δ
δ+

  . Thus, for any finite ,k j
+∈] ,  ( , ) ,
1M
k j δ δδ
⎛ ⎞⊆ ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
 ^  . 
(iii) Finally, we show that P can likewise admit a profile where j=1 and k →∞  by satisfying (1.2) 
and the IRC. Consider the strategy profile 1,kσ . Then, k →∞ 1, 1, ˆk kP PD V⇒ Π ≥ > , making  (1.2) 
the only binding constraint. We write (1.2) as (1 )1  
( )
k
k j P P
P
P
A δ δδ δ δ
+ −≤ + −   and as k →∞ , this 
implies that 1,kσ  is supported for as long as 1
P
A δδ≥ − +

. 
(Step 2.2)   Similarly, we set a correspondence ( )( ): ,1P δ+ +× → ^ ] ] P  defined by  
    
1
1( , ) ( ,1)  , where ( , ) , (0,1),and ˆ( )
k
j k cP
P P P P k
P P
V Vk j A k j A
V V
δδ δ δ δ δδ δ δ
− + +
−
⎧ ⎫−−= ∈ ≤ + ∈ × ∈ =⎨ ⎬− −⎩ ⎭
 ^ ] ] .  
We argue in a similar fashion as above where in this case sup ( , )P k j^ =1 and inf ( , )P k j^ is 
solved by the equality condition of (1.2).  By Lemma 5 (ii), it implies that inf ( , )P ok j^  increases 
in k, therefore ( , )P k j^  is monotone decreasing in k i.e. ( , )P ok j^ ( 1, )P ok j⊃ +^ . On the other 
hand, ( , )P k j^  is monotone increasing in j i.e. ( , )P ok j^ ( , 1)P ok j⊂ +^  since inf ( , )P ok j^  
decreases in j. Thus, set ( , )P k j^ is largest when k=1 and j →∞ (and this can easily pass the IRC, 
e.g. ,1 ˆjP VΠ >  for j →∞ ). By plugging in these values in the equality of (1.2), we obtain the 
lowest Pδ  as 
2( 1) ( 1) 4
2P
A A A
A
δδ + ± + −=  . Since lim 1PA δ→−∞ =  > 1lim PA δ δ→− =   > 0lim PA δ δ→ =  , this 
                                                 
8 ( )( )0,δP  reads as the power set of the interval ( )0,δ . 
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implies that for any finite ,k j +∈]  and A<0, ( )( , ) , 1P k j δ⊆ ^ . Finally, we show that strategy 
profiles ,1jσ and 1, jσ , where j →∞ , are both admissible to player M. Suppose Mδ δ→  , then we 
see that 2
j M
M
M
δ δδ δ δ
−≥ −

  0
jδ⇔ ≥  is satisfied even if j →∞ . 
 
(b)    
Since 〉〈Π jkM ,  = ( ) (1 )1
k
c M
ck j
M
V V Vδδ +
′− − +′−  and 
1 (0,1)
1
k
M
k j
M
δ
δ +
′− ∈′−  for any ,k j
+∈] and ( , )MMδ δ δ′ ∈  , we 
obtain 〉〈Π jkM , ),( VVc∈ . A similar argument also allows us to show that ,j kM〈 〉Π ),( VVc∈ . 
For player P with ( ,1)PPδ δ′ ∈ , the IRC is binding only for some pairs of ,k j +∈] , such that 
〉〈Π jkP , = ( ) (1 ) ˆ1
k
c P
ck j
P
V V V Vδδ +
′− − + >′−  ⇔  
1 1( ) log
log 1 jP P
k k j ηδ ηδ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞−< = ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟′ ′−⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 where 
ˆ
(0,1)c
c
V V
V V
η −= ∈− . 
This shows that when ( )k k j< , we have 〉〈Π jkP , >Vˆ  and since 1 (0,1)1
k
P
k j
P
δ
δ +
′− ∈′− , we clearly have 
〉〈Π jkP , ),ˆ( cVV∈ . Similarly, it can be shown that the IRC is satisfied for profile ,j kPσ 〈 〉  iff ( )j j k< =  
1 log
log 1 (1 ) kP P
η
δ η δ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟′ ′− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
. Thus, when ( )j j k< , we have ,j kP〈 〉Π ),ˆ( cVV∈  since 1 (0,1)1
j
P
j k
P
δ
δ +
′− ∈′− . 
■ 
 
Lemma 5. 
The real roots Mδ  and Pδ  of the equations 1j MM k
M
δ δδ δ δ +
−= −

  and ( )11
k
j k P
P P k
P P
A δδ δ δ δ δ
−
−
−= − − , 
respectively,  that exist and belong to the interval (0,1), behave in the following manner with 
respect to k and j , for any ,k j +∈] . 
 
  (i)  < 0 M
k
δ∂
∂ and > 0
M
j
δ∂
∂      (ii) > 0 
P
k
δ∂
∂ and  < 0 
P
j
δ∂
∂  
 
Proof :  Appendix 
 
 
(c) Sets of perfect equilibrium payoffs 
 
The result in Theorem 1 shows that for any combination of finite number of stages of tolerance (k) 
and cooperation (j), perfect equilibrium payoffs can be achieved for any discount factors between 
the interval ,
1
δδ δ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
   for M and between ( ,1)δ  for P. Each combination of k and j therefore 
generates a distinct set of possible equilibrium payoffs for both players under the strategies 
),( ,, 〉〈〉〈 jkP
jk
M σσ  and , ,( , )j k j kM Pσ σ〈 〉 〈 〉 . Through the results of Lemma 4, we graph some of these sets in 
Figure 2. Note however that for some combinations of k and j, it is possible for P to generate 
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payoffs lower than Vˆ and yet satisfies the condition in Proposition 2. These strategy profiles that 
yield such payoffs violate the definition of TTS (individually rational condition) and are therefore 
not equilibrium outcomes. On the other hand, there is no danger for M to fail the individually 
rational condition since its payoff structure is always above cV .     
 
Lemma 4.  For any given ,k j +∈] , \{1}α +∈] , )~,( δδδ MM ∈ ,  and )1,( PP δδ ∈ : 
 (i)   〉〈Π jkM ,  > ,j kM〈 〉Π  
 (ii)  〉〈Π kjP ,  > 〉〈Π jkP ,  
 (iii) ,j kM
〈 〉Π > ,j kMα α〈 〉Π  and ,k jM〈 〉Π < ,k jMα α〈 〉Π   
 (iv) ,j kP
〈 〉Π > ,j kP α〈 〉Π  and 〉〈Π jkP , > ,k jPα〈 〉Π  
 
Proof :   Appendix 
 
Remark:  
Lemma 4 illustrates well how the use of strategies ,k j〈 〉σ and ,j k〈 〉σ  and the level of k and j affect 
the players average payoffs. The patient player, for instance, obtains higher payoff under the 
strategy ,j k〈 〉σ than in ,k j〈 〉σ  for any given k and j. Moreover, she is always better off when the 
number of tolerant stages (k) is kept as low as possible. 
 
 
 
Player P
Player M
ˆ ˆ( , )V V
( , )V V ( , )V V
( , )V V
( , )c cV V
Player M
Player P
#
# #
#
#
ˆ( , )cV V ( , )c cV V
2; 2j k= =
1; 1j k= =
1; 2j k= =
3; 2j k= =
4; 2j k= =
2; 1j k= =
3; 1j k= =
1; 2k j= = 1; 3k j= =
1; 1k j= =
2; 3k j= =
2; 1k j= =
2; 2k j= =
ˆ( , )V V
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Each rectangular block in the figure corresponds to a set of perfect equilibrium 
      payoffs generated by the strategy ,k j〈 〉σ or ,j k〈 〉σ . The label 2; 1j k= = ,  for     
      example, signifies that the strategy 2, 1j k〈 〉= =σ is used. 
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5. Limit Tolerance, Optimal Tolerance, and Cooperative Tolerance   
 
In this section, we study the case where a fixed Mδ ′  is set within the range ( , )Mδ δ  vis-à-vis a Pδ  
that is very close to 1. The idea here is to answer the question how long can a very patient player 
tolerate a given impatient person in such a way that they still maintain an equilibrium payoff better 
than what they will receive in a single stage-game. This notion of limit tolerance explores the 
boundary to which PTTS can remain effective and enforceable. Moreover, it is also an interest to 
know how a patient player, in the course of setting offers of tolerance to the other, optimizes her 
returns. Thus, apart from generating superior equlibria, she is also concerned of maximizing her 
average income without making the other defect at any time of the game. Notice however that as 
the patient player tries to increase her payoff towards cV , the other’s payoff sinks towards cV  from 
above. This, in the end, leads us to conjecture the attainability of a cooperative outcome. 
 
Proposition 3.  For a given )~,( δδδ MM ∈′  and any Pδ  close to 1:  
 
(a) (Limit Tolerance) the maximum level of tolerance P can render to M for any j′ number of 
cooperative stages (regardless of payoffs) , is   
    
ˆ( )
ˆ( )
cV Vk j
V V
∗ ⎛ ⎞−′= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
] ,  
  where ( )x] is defined as the greatest integer less than x. 
 
 (b) (Optimal Tolerance) player P maximizes her income from a PTTS by offering ∗j stages of 
cooperation and a 1-stage tolerance, i.e. 〉〈
∗Π=Π 1,max jPP  , where   
 
     2
1 log
log
M
M M
j δ δδ δ δ
∗ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞′−= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟′ ′−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠

]  ,  
  and where ( )x] is the greatest integer less than or equal to x. 
 
(c) (Cooperative Tolerance) the cooperative outcome ( ),c cV V can be approximated as Mδ δ′ →  . 
 
 
Despite the asymmetric payoffs earned by players through a tolerant strategy profile, cooperative 
outcome can almost be reproduced under certain conditions (i.e. when Mδ ′  approaches δ  and 
when j is set at a high level). This result is appreciated better when we recall that under the usual 
trigger strategy, when Mδ ′  becomes just belowδ , the effect is evident as the once achievable 
cooperative outcome can no longer be supported by pure strategies and the game immediately 
drops to a lower equilibrium ˆ ˆ( , )V V . Hence, in situations when Mδ δ′ <  , the PTTS not only can 
offer superior equilibria than the normal trigger strategy, but also can achieve an almost-
cooperative outcome.   
 18
 
 
Proof: 
(a) We are interested in finding { } { }{ },, , ˆsup , for any j kj k j kP P Pk k D V j∗ + 〈 〉 〈 〉 += ∈ Π ≥ Π > ∈] ∩ ] as 
we consider the profile ,j kPσ . As 1Pδ → , the condition { },, j kj kP PD〈 〉Π ≥ { }, ˆj kP V〈 〉Π >∩  leads to the 
inequality requirement ,j kP
〈 〉Π = ( )c jV V Vj k− ++  Vˆ> , for any ,j k
+∈] . Rearranging, we obtain 
ˆ
ˆ
cV Vk j
V V
⎛ ⎞−< ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
. In the case of profile ,k jPσ , the condition { },, k jk jP PD〈 〉Π ≥ { }, ˆk jP VΠ >∩  leads to 
,k j
P
〈 〉Π  = ( )c ckV V Vk j− ++  Vˆ>  as 1Pδ →  and for any ,j k
+∈] . Rearranging, we get an identical 
result to profile ,j kPσ  above.   Thus, k∗  is the highest integer less than 
ˆ( )
ˆ( )
cV Vj
V V
−
− , for any j
+∈] . 
And since profiles ,j k
∗σ and ,k j∗σ could easily pass the equilibrium requirements for M, we have 
completed the proof for (a). 
 
(b)  By Lemma 4(ii), P receives a higher payoff from the profile ,j kσ  than from ,k jσ . Moreover, 
for any j, ,j kP
〈 〉Π  is highest when k=1 by Lemma 4(iv). Now, we apply the condition 
{ },1,1 jji iD〈 〉Π ≥ ∩ { },1 ˆji V〈 〉Π > for both players. For P, we see from (a) that as 1Pδ → , this implies 
that 
ˆ
ˆ
cV Vk j
V V
⎛ ⎞−< ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
 . Once this is satisfied, any further increase in the number of cooperative 
stages, j, would never induce P to deviate. This is not so, however, for M whose incentive not to 
deviate is given by 1
j M
M k
M
δ δδ δ δ +
′−′ ≥ ′−

 1
1 log
log
M
k
M M
j δ δδ δ δ +
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞′−⇔ ≤ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟′ ′−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠

 . Thus, for k=1, the highest j 
that could still make M abide is 2
1 log
log
M
M M
j δ δδ δ δ
∗ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞′−= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟′ ′−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠

]  , where ( )x]  is the greatest integer 
less than or equal to x . 
 
(c) Since P is never constrained by any increase of the number of cooperative stages for as long as 
ˆ
ˆ
cV Vk j
V V
⎛ ⎞−< ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
, then we see that ,
1
( ) (1 )lim
1P
j
j k c P
P cj k
Pj
V V V Vδ
δ
δ
〈 〉
+→
→∞
− −Π = + =− . On the other end, one can 
also observe that ,lim j kMj
〈 〉
→∞Π  = cV . However, M has to satisfy the condition 1
j M
M k
M
δ δδ δ δ +
′−′ ≥ ′−

  to 
generate perfect equilibrium points. Observe that even if j →∞ , this condition for M can still be 
satisfied when  Mδ δ′ →   since 1lim 0
M
M
k
M
δ δ
δ δ
δ δ +′ →
′− =′−

  , for any k
+∈] .  ■ 
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6. Equilibrium Restoration 
 
As in the previous discussion, δ  is defined as the smallest value of Mδ  that can support the 
cooperative outcome cV  in equilibrium under the normal trigger strategy. In fact, as long as 
Mδ δ>  ,  not only cV  but all  MV s  in R and that are above cV  can be sustained in equilibrium when 
there is public randomization. Notice also that each of these MV s has its corresponding threshold 
discount factor that decreases as MV  increases. Now, we define: 
 
      ( )inf (0,1) ,  for all  such that vector ,ˆM M MV V V V RV Vδ δ δ
⎧ ⎫−= ∈ = ∈ ⋅ ∈⎨ ⎬−⎩ ⎭
? ? ? ?  
 
Therefore, when M is extremely impatient such that Mδ δ< ? , there is no more payoff MV  in R (i.e. 
feasible and individually rational) that can achieve equilibrium. This complete loss of equilibrium 
payoffs can nonetheless be restored using PTTS which only manifests its greater efficiency over 
the normal trigger strategy in situations when an impatient player exists.   
 
Theorem 2.  (Equilibrium Restoration) For some Mδ δ< ?  such that there is no more individually 
rational payoff that can be sustained in equilibrium by the normal trigger strategy, there still exist 
some individually rational equilibria using PTTS. 
 
Proof: 
 
Let MV R
∗ ∈  be the highest average payoff for M that can be sustained in perfect equilibrium using 
the normal trigger strategy with public randomization, if needed. Denote its corresponding 
discount factor threshold as δ? , such that for every Mδ δ ε= −? , for small 0ε > , there is no more 
MV in R that can be supported in equilibrium by the normal strategy. Pick two pure strategy 
payoffs:  V  being the highest possible and cV  being any pure strategy payoff in R. Consider MV ′  as 
an average payoff generated by a PTTS ,j kσ , such that ( ), , , , ,j kM M c MV V V k jδ′ = Π . By Theorem 
1(a), we see however that equilibrium for M can still be obtained for all 
2
1
δε δ≤ +

 .
9 By Theorem 
1(b), the individually rational condition is satisfied for both players. Thus, P receives 
simultaneously a payoff ( ),  , , , ,j kP P c PV V V k jδ〈 〉′ = Π  greater than Vˆ , for some ,k j +∈] . And since 
payoff function is continuous in 2\ , the vector ( , )M PV V′ ′  always exists for any Mδ ε δ δ− ≤ <? ?  and 
1Pδ < .  ■ 
 
 
                                                 
9 By Proposition 2, the same result applies for both players if ,k jσ instead of  ,j kσ  is used. 
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7. Generalization of G ),( PM δδ∞ into any Two-person Game 
 
The main result in this section is presented in the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 3.  The results in Theorem 1 continue to hold for any two-person game G ),( PM δδ∞ . 
 
Theorem 1 restricts the result to prisoner’s dilemma game where punishment regime is intrinsically 
a Nash equilibrium while Theorem 3 generalizes the result to any two-person infinitely repeated 
game. The main feature of the proof of the latter is the typical simple punishment strategy 
proposed by Abreu (1988) that imposes the same punishment for any deviation and which does not 
lead to an escalating hierarchy of punishments as a result of dependence on past deviations. 
Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) used this method in a form of limited punishment which the proof 
of the above theorem tries also to employ. 
 
The use of the minimaxing payoff ˆ ˆ( , )V V  in prisoner’s dilemma simplifies significantly the 
generation of equilibrium. In general, however, employing minimaxing payoff during the 
punishment regime may require mixed or correlated strategies since direct pure-strategy actions 
may not be possible. In this scenario, we simply assume that mixed strategies are observable or 
that there exists a public randomization device that can attain the minimaxing payoff ˆ ˆ( , )M PV V  so 
that any deviation from these strategies can be detected. Unfortunately, the result of Fudenberg and 
Maskin (1991), which shows the possibility of attaining it through a cyclical set of pure-strategy 
actions, cannot be applied here since that result requires all players to be very patient. 
 
Proof:  
Define a punishment regime (ála Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986) where both players play their 
respective minimaxing payoffs ˆ ˆ( , )M PV V  once a deviation occurs. Play this for z number of stages, 
enough to fully remove whatever the deviant has gained, then both move back to the contract path. 
If there is any deviation while in the punishment regime, then restart the punishment regime. 
 
We conclude from Lemmas 1-3 that any deviation could only be made most rewarding for M 
during the very first stage of cooperation, while for P, it is during the last stage of cooperation. 
This means that under a strategy profile ),( ,, 〉〈〉〈 jkP
jk
M σσ , the punishment regime could independently 
set in on the (k+1)th stage and on the (k+j) th stage for M and P, respectively. As before, to 
guarantee a no-deviation game scenario, each player’s payoff over the entire game must be at least 
as much as their respective highest (entire-game) deviation payoffs.  Hence, 
 
〉〈Π jkM ,  =  1 1( ) (1 )     (1 )1
k
k kc M
c M Mk j
M
V V V Vδ δ ϕ δδ
+ +
+
− − + ≥ − +− ,                            (3.1) 
  where ,ˆ(1 )z z k jM M M M MVϕ δ δ < >= − + Π  
 
〉〈Π jkP ,  = ( ) ( ) 1( ) (1 )    1
k
k k j k jc P
c c P P c P P Pk j
P
V V V V V V V V Vδ δ δ δ ϕ δδ
+ − +
+
− − + ≥ + − + − − +− ,            (3.2) 
  where ,ˆ(1 )z z k jP P P P PVϕ δ δ < >= − + Π  
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In case a deviation occurs, Mϕ  and Pϕ  will be the respective discounted average payoffs of the 
two players during punishment regime, as computed based on the mechanics described in the first 
paragraph of this proof. Notice that whenever a player deviates during this regime, z increases 
since punishment regime starts again. And since both Mϕ  and Pϕ  decline continuously as z 
increases, both players will find no gain from deviating (or from not punishing) at this phase, thus, 
making the punishment regime binding.  
 
By the minimum level of z that satisfies equations (3.1) and (3.2), we are assured that any gain 
from a one-shot deviation is neutralized and therefore not worth taking in the end. Now, think of a 
largest one-shot deviation that requires an almost infinite number of stages, z, to wipe out the gain 
that the deviant has obtained. This pushes down Mϕ  and Pϕ  to their respective limit value of  MVˆ  
and PVˆ  (i.e. since ˆlim i iz Vϕ→∞ = ). By substituting MVˆ  and PVˆ  respectively to equations (3.1) and (3.2), 
we reached the same no-deviation conditions given in Proposition 2 and can show subsequently 
the similar conditions, as in Theorem 1(b), that generate individually rational outcomes.  And since 
this result analogously applies to profile , ,( , )j k j kM Pσ σ〈 〉 〈 〉 , we have completed the proof.  ■ 
 
 
8. Final Remarks  
 
The PTTS presented here are not the only types of TTS that are sustainable in perfect equilibrium. 
Other tractable forms of TTS, though maybe quite complex in structure, may still prove to generate 
sets of equilibrium payoff (an escalating contract path ( , , , , , , , , , , , ,...)c c c c c cV V V V V V V V V V V V  is one 
example). Moreover, even within the realm of cyclical TTS, certain structures that are different 
from the presented PTTS may also generate sets of equilibrium payoffs. The problem, however, is 
that some of them may not have a monotonic property (as in Lemma 3) which makes it difficult to 
characterize the timing of the highest-yielding possible deviation. Consider the strategy profile 
with a recurrent contract structure ( ), , , , , , , ,c c c cV V V V V V V V V . For some values of Mδ  and Pδ , it is 
possible for M to have its highest temptation on the 5th period (instead of 3rd) while for P on the 6th 
period (instead of 9th). Therefore, when one is presented with a long unsystematic contract path 
that is infinitely repeated, the greatest possible temptation to deviate may lie somewhere in the 
middle of the contract regime which would be laborious to characterize. In the end, our treatment 
of equilibrium outcomes for TTS in this paper is not exhaustive and is limited only to simple 
periodic strategies.  
 
Furthermore, our study is confined only to two-player games. It would still be possible to find 
equilibrium payoffs in an n-player case, provided that a periodic contract that exhibits monotonic 
payoff streams is adopted (although not the only means). However, the characterization of perfect 
equilibria may prove to be elusive as it may require a more sophisticated punishment system when 
there is more than one impatient player in a game. In this scenario, it seeks to determine how the 
number of impatient players influence the equilibrium outcomes of an n-player game, given the 
players’ varying discount factors. We leave these questions at this moment open for further 
research. 
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Appendix: 
 
Proposition 2: (Equivalence) For any ,k j +∈] , the PTTS ),( ,, 〉〈〉〈 jkPjkM σσ  and ),( ,, 〉〈〉〈 kjPkjM σσ  
constitute the same range of values of Mδ  and Pδ  that can support  the no-deviation condition 
during the contract regime of the repeated game. These values are defined by the following 
conditions: 
 For player M:     1
j M
M k
M
δ δδ δ δ +
−≥ −

      
 For player P:     ( )11
k
j k P
P P k
P P
A δδ δ δ δ δ
−
−
−≤ + −  , where 0A <   
 
Proof: We prove this directly by showing that the simplified form of , ,k j k ji iD∏ ≥  and 
, ,j k j k
i iD∏ ≥  are the same for each i. 
 
(A)  , ,k j k ji iD∏ ≥ : 
      a1)   For player M :  
 ,k jM
〈 〉Π  = ( ) 1( ) (1 ) ˆ  1
k
kc M
c Mk j
M
V V V V V Vδ δδ
+
+
− − + ≥ − −−  = 
,k j
MD     
           
1
( ) (1 )  1ˆ( ) ( )
k
k jc M
Mk
c M
V V
V V V V
δ δδ
+
+
− −⇒ ≥ −− − − (The denominator is always positive 
      since 1( )ˆ( )
kc
M
V V
V V
δ δ +− = >−
  and so the sign “≥ ” is maintained ) 
           1
(1 ) 1
( )
k
k j M
M k
M
δ δδ δ δ
+
+
−⇒ ≥ − −

    1 
j M
M k
M
δ δδ δ δ +
−⇒ ≥ −

 . 
      a2)  For player P :  
,k j
P
〈 〉Π  = ( ) ( ) ( )1( ) (1 ) ˆ  1
k
k k j k jc P
c c P c P Pk j
P
V V V V V V V V V Vδ δ δ δδ
+ − +
+
− − + ≥ − − + − − −−  =  
,k j
PD    
          ( )( ) ( ) ( )1( ) (1 ) ˆ 11
k
k k j k jc P
c P c P Pk j
P
V V V V V V V Vδ δ δ δδ
+ − +
+
− −⇒ ≥ − − + − − −−  
          1( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )ˆ ˆ( )(1 ) ( )
k
k k j k jc P c
P P Pk j
P
V V V V
V V V V
δ δ δδ δδ
+ − +
+
− − −⇒ ≥ − + −− − −
  
          ( ) (1 ) ( ) ˆ( )(1 )
k
c P P
k j
PP
V V
V V
δ δ δ
δδ +
− − −⇒ ≥− −

 ( ) (1 )1  ˆ ( )( )
k
k j c P P
P
P
V V
V V
δ δδ δ δ
+ − −⇒ ≤ + −−   
          ( )11
k
j k P
P P k
P P
A δδ δ δ δ δ
−
−
−⇒ ≤ + −  , where 
 0ˆ
cV VA
V V
−= <−  
(B)  , ,j k j ki iD∏ ≥ : 
First, we note that in a no-deviation scenario, the strategy ,,( , )j kj kM Pσ σ〈 〉  yields:  
 24
 〉〈Π kjM ,  =  VVV kj
M
j
Mc +−
−−
+δ
δ
1
)1()(
 and 〉〈Π kjP ,  =  VVV kj
P
j
Pc +−
−−
+δ
δ
1
)1()(
. 
Then, we write as follows the discounted payoff over the entire game of a one-shot deviation 
scenario. We note, from the analogue of  Lemma 2 that starts with cooperation, that it is never 
profitable to deviate during the stages of tolerance, thus, 
 , 1 1
1 2
ˆ(1 )
q
j k t q t
M M c M M M
t t q
D V V Vδ δ δ δ∞− −
= = +
⎛ ⎞= − + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  and 
 , 1 1
1 2
ˆ(1 )
r
j k t r t
P P c P P P
t t r
D V V Vδ δ δ δ∞− −
= = +
⎛ ⎞= − + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ ,  
where q and r are again the numbers of stages given to cooperation by M and P, respectively, just 
before defecting in the next stage. From Lemma 3, observe that , ( )j ki iD θ= ⋅ when k is set to 0, for 
both i. This shows that ,j kiD  is also monotonic in q and r, in a same manner specified in Lemma 
3, thus:  
 
      (b1)   For player M, the highest deviation payoff occurs when q = 0: 
 〉〈Π kjM ,  =  VVV kj
M
j
Mc +−
−−
+δ
δ
1
)1()(
   ˆ(1 )M MV Vδ δ≥ − +   =  ,j kMD  
            (1 ) (1 )j k jM M Mδ δ δ δ +⇒ − ≤ − 1k j jM M Mδ δ δ δδ+ +⇒ ≤ − +   
                       1( )j kM M Mδ δ δ δ δ+⇒ − ≤ −      1j MM k
M
δ δδ δ δ +
−⇒ ≥ −

  . 
      (b2)   For player P, the highest deviation payoff occurs when r = j-1: 
 ,j kP
〈 〉Π   =  VVV kj
P
j
Pc +−
−−
+δ
δ
1
)1()(
   1 ˆ( ) ( )j jc c P PV V V V Vδ δ−≥ + − − −   = ,j kPD  
            1 ˆ( )(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 )j j j j kc P c c P P PV V V V V V V Vδ δ δ δ− +⎡ ⎤⇒ − − ≥ − + − − − −⎣ ⎦  
            1 ˆ( )( 1) ( )(1 )j k j j kP c P P c P P PV V V V V Vδ δ δ δ δ δ− +⇒ − − ≥ − − + −  
            ( ) (1 ) ( )( 1)ˆ( )
k j kc
P P P P
V V
V V
δ δ δ δ δ +−⇒ − ≥ − −−
   (1 )1
( )
k
j k P
P P
P
A δδ δ δ δ
+ −⇒ ≤ + −  .      
            ( )11
k
j k P
P P k
P P
A δδ δ δ δ δ
−
−
−⇒ ≤ + −  , where 0A < . 
Comparing the results of (a1) with (b1) and (a2) with (b2), we conclude that the conditions 
,j k
i
〈 〉Π ,j kiD≥  and ,k ji〈 〉Π ,k jiD≥ constitute the same range of values for Mδ  and Pδ  for every 
given k and j.   ■ 
 
Lemma 4: For any given ,k j +∈] , \{1}α +∈] , )~,( δδδ MM ∈ ,  and )1,( PP δδ ∈ : 
 (i)   〉〈Π jkM ,  > ,j kM〈 〉Π  
 (ii)  〉〈Π kjP ,  > 〉〈Π jkP ,  
 (iii) ,j kM
〈 〉Π > ,j kMα α〈 〉Π  and ,k jM〈 〉Π < ,k jMα α〈 〉Π   
 (iv) ,j kP
〈 〉Π > ,j kP α〈 〉Π  and 〉〈Π jkP , > ,k jPα〈 〉Π  
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Proof: 
(i)  Suppose −Π 〉〈 jkM , 0, ≤Π 〉〈 kjM . Then, −+−
−−
+ cjk
M
k
Mc V
VV
δ
δ
1
)1()(
0
1
)1()( ≤−−
−−
+ V
VV
kj
M
j
Mc
δ
δ . 
     01
1
1
1
1)( ≤⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−
−+−
−−⇒ ++ jk
M
j
M
jk
M
k
M
cVV δ
δ
δ
δ ( )(1 )(1 ) 0j kc M MV V δ δ⇒ − − − ≤ .  
Since 0>− cVV  and that , (0,1)k jM Mδ δ ∈  for any finite ,k j +∈] , the above inequality is a 
contradiction, thus −Π 〉〈 jkM , 0, >Π 〉〈 kjM .   
(ii) Suppose −Π 〉〈 kjP , 0, ≤Π 〉〈 jkP .Then, −+−
−−
+ V
VV
kj
P
j
Pc
δ
δ
1
)1()(
0
1
)1()( ≤−−
−−
+ cjk
P
k
Pc V
VV
δ
δ . 
      01
1
1
1
1
)( ≤⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−
−+−
−−⇒ ++ kj
P
k
P
kj
P
j
P
c VV δ
δ
δ
δ   ( )(1 )(1 ) 0k jc P PV V δ δ⇒ − − − ≤ .  
Since VVc >  and with the similar argument as (i) above, we have a contradiction. Therefore, 
−Π 〉〈 kjP ,  0, >Π 〉〈 jkP . 
(iii)  Suppose ,j kM
〈 〉Π  ,j kMα α〈 〉≤ Π . Then, we have: 
        ,j kM
〈 〉Π = ( ) (1 )
1
j
c M
j k
M
V V Vδδ +
− − +−  ( )
( ) (1 )
1
j
c M
j k
M
V V V
α
α
δ
δ +
− −≤ +−  = 
,j k
M
α α〈 〉Π  
        (1 )
(1 )
j
M
j k
M
δ
δ +
−⇒ −  ( )
(1 )
(1 )
j
M
j k
M
α
α
δ
δ +
−≥ − since 0cV V− <   
        
2( ) ( 1)( )(1 )(1 )
(1 )
j k j k j k j k
M M M M
j k
M
αδ δ δ δ
δ
+ + + − +
+
− + + + +⇒ −
…  
2 ( 1)(1 )(1 )
(1 )
j j j j
M M M M
j
M
αδ δ δ δ
δ
−− + + + +≥ −
…  
        2 2 ( 1) ( 1)(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 0j k j k j kM M M M M M
α αδ δ δ δ δ δ− −⇒ − + − + + − ≤… , which is a contradiction since all 
 terms are positive for ( )0,1Mδ ∈ , ,k j +∈] , and \{1}α +∈] . Hence, ,j kM〈 〉Π > ,j kMα α〈 〉Π . 
         Similarly, suppose ,k jM
〈 〉Π  ,k jMα α〈 〉≥ Π . Then,  
         ,k jM
〈 〉Π = ( ) (1 )
1
k
c M
ck j
M
V V Vδδ +
− − +−  ( )
( ) (1 )
1
k
c M
ck j
M
V V V
α
α
δ
δ +
− −≥ +−  = 
,k j
M
α α〈 〉Π  
         
2( ) ( 1)( )(1 )(1 )
(1 )
k j k j k j k j
M M M M
k j
M
αδ δ δ δ
δ
+ + + − +
+
− + + + +⇒ −
…   
2 ( 1)(1 )(1 )
(1 )
k k k k
M M M M
k
M
αδ δ δ δ
δ
−− + + + +≥ −
…  
         2 2 ( 1) ( 1)(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 0k j k j k jM M M M M M
α αδ δ δ δ δ δ− −⇒ − + − + + − ≤… , also a contradiction. 
(iv)  Suppose ,j kP
α〈 〉Π  ,j kP〈 〉≥ Π . Then ,j kP α〈 〉Π = ( ) (1 )1
j
c P
j k
P
V V Vα
δ
δ +
− − +−
( ) (1 )
1
j
c P
j k
P
V V Vδδ +
− −≥ +−  
        1 1
(1 ) (1 )j k j kP P
αδ δ+ +⇒ ≥− −
j k j k
P P
αδ δ+ +⇒ ≥ , a contradiction for all ( )0,1Pδ ∈ , ,k j +∈] , and        
        \{1}α +∈] . Hence, ,j kP α〈 〉Π < ,j kP〈 〉Π . 
        Suppose ,k jP
α〈 〉Π  ,k jP〈 〉≥ Π . Then, ,k jPα〈 〉Π = ( ) (1 )1
k
c P
ck j
P
V V V
α
α
δ
δ +
− − +−
( ) (1 )
1
k
c P
ck j
P
V V Vδδ +
− −≥ +−  
         (1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )k k j k j kP P P P
α αδ δ δ δ+ +⇒ − − ≤ − − ,  since 0cV V− <  
         (1 )( ) 0j k kP P P
αδ δ δ⇒ − − ≤ , which is not true for any ( )0,1Pδ ∈ and \{1}α +∈] . ■ 
 26
Lemma 5:  
The real roots Mδ  and Pδ  of the equations 1j MM k
M
δ δδ δ δ +
−= −

  and ( )11
k
j k P
P P k
P P
A δδ δ δ δ δ
−
−
−= − − , 
respectively,  that exist and belong to the interval (0,1), behave in the following manner with 
respect to k and j , for any ,k j +∈] . 
 
  (i)  < 0 M
k
δ∂
∂ and > 0
M
j
δ∂
∂      (ii) > 0 
P
k
δ∂
∂ and  < 0 
P
j
δ∂
∂  
Proof: 
(i) Let the first equation be redefined as an implicit function ( ) 1, , :
1
k j
M M
M j
M
F k j δ δδ δδ
+ +−= =−
 . Then,       
     = M
M
F
k
Fk
δ
δ
∂∂ ∂− ∂∂ ∂
 and = M
M
F
j
Fj
δ
δ
∂∂ ∂− ∂∂ ∂
, where 0
M
F
δ
∂ ≠∂  for any (0,1)Mδ ∈  and ,k j
+∈] . 
By differentiating,  
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(1 )(1 ( 1) ) (1 )
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j k j k j j
M M M M
j
M M
k j jF δ δ δ δ
δ δ
+ +− − + + + −∂ =∂ − = 2
( 1)( 1) ( 1) 1
(1 )
k j j j
M M M
j
M
k j jδ δ δ
δ
+ ⎡ ⎤+ − − + − +⎣ ⎦
−   
We start by setting k=j=1 which gives us,  
3 2
2
2 3 1 0
(1 )
M M
M M
F δ δ
δ δ
− +∂ = >∂ − , for any (0,1)Mδ ∈ . We 
show that the numerator, denoted as z, further increases away from zero when either k or j 
increases. First, ( )( 1) ln ( 1)(1 )k j j jM M M Mz k jk δ δ δ δ+∂ ⎡ ⎤= − − + − +⎣ ⎦∂ . For this expression to be 
positive, it must be that:  
  ( )( 1) ( 1)(1 ) lnj jM M Mk jδ δ δ− > + − +  1 ( 1)ln (1 )jM M
jkδ δ
−⇔ < + + − .  
Note that ln 0,  (0,1)M Mδ δ< ∀ ∈ , and that the right hand side is least when k=j=1, i.e. 
1 12
ln (1 )M Mδ δ
− < + − , which is always true for all (0,1)Mδ ∈ . Thus, increasing k only increases the 
right hand side, making 0z k
∂ >∂ . Next, we show that 0z j∂ >∂ . Observe that 
 ( 1)( 1) ( 1) 1k j j jM M Mz k j jδ δ δ+ ⎡ ⎤= + − − + − +⎣ ⎦  > ( 1)( 1) ( 1) 1k j j k jM M Mk j jδ δ δ+ +⎡ ⎤+ − − + − +⎣ ⎦   
                >  ( 1)( 1) 1 1k j jM Mkδ δ+ ⎡ ⎤+ − − +⎣ ⎦   > 0  when  k=j=1, (0,1)Mδ∀ ∈ . 
Although the first term is always negative, it approaches zero as j increases. Thus, 0z >  for any 
,k j +∈] and (0,1)Mδ ∈ , which implies that 0
M
F δ∂ >∂ . 
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Now, since ln 0,  (0,1)M Mδ δ< ∀ ∈ , we see that 
1 ln 0
1
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M M
j
M
F
k
δ δ
δ
+ +−∂ = >∂ −  and 
F
j
∂ ∂  
( )
( )
1
2
1 ln
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M M M
j
M
δ δ δ
δ
+ −= <
−
, for any ,k j +∈] and (0,1)Mδ ∈ . Following the formula above, we obtain 
0M
k
δ∂ <∂ and > 0
M
j
δ∂
∂  .  
(ii) Let the second equation be redefined as an implicit function ( ), , :PG k j δ =  
( )
( )
1
1
1
k
P
P k j
P
A δδ δδ +
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟+ =⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
 . Then, 2
ˆ
1
(1 )k jP P
G Az
δ δ +
∂ = +∂ − , ( )( ) ( )ˆ 1 1 ( 1) ( ) 1k j k k k jP P P Pz k k jδ δ δ δ+ += − − + + + − . 
We will show that 0
P
G
δ
∂ >∂  for any ,k j
+∈] . First, observe that: 
  2ˆ 1 ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)k k j k jP P Pz k k j jδ δ δ+ += − + + + − − −  1 ( 1)k j kP Pk kδ δ+> + − +  
      ( )1 ( 1)k jP Pk kδ δ= + − +  >  0  for k=j=1. 
 As k increases, zˆ remains positive and approaches 1; while as j increases, ˆ 0z >  for as long as 
1/1
1
k
P k
δ ⎛ ⎞< ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠ , otherwise if ˆ 0z ≤ , we are done with 0P
G δ∂ >∂  since A is negative. Thus, when 
ˆ 0z > , 0
P
G δ∂ >∂  iff 
2(1 )
ˆ
k j
PA
z
δ +−≥ − . To determine the least lower bound of A, see that (a) as 
k →∞  for any j , 1A≥ − ; (b) as j →∞ , the bound is least when k=1,  i.e. 1
1 2 P
A δ≥ − − ;  and (c) 
for k=j=1, 2(1 )PA δ≥ − + . By (b), A →−∞  as (1/ 2)Pδ −→  and so 0
P
G δ∂ >∂  for any  
,k j +∈]  and for 0A< . Next, we see that 
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P
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δ δ δ
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+
−∂ = <∂ −  and 
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1
2
(1 ) ln 0
(1 )
k j k
P P P
k j
P
Aδ δ δ
δ
+ +
+
− >−  for all (0,1)Pδ ∈  and ,k j
+∈] . Hence, from the analogous formula in 
(i), we have > 0 P k
δ∂
∂ and < 0 P j
δ∂
∂ .   ■ 
 
 
 
 
